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Water Buy-Back in Australia:  Political, Technical and 
Allocative Challenges 
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Abstract 
State and Federal governments are increasingly reliant on the re-purchase of 
water access rights as a vehicle for bringing ‘over-allocation’ in the Murray-
Darling Basin into check.  Not surprisingly, this has attracted criticism from 
several quarters, usually on the basis that such mechanisms produce 
unnecessary hardship for rural communities.  Set against this are the views of 
many economists who have bemoaned the modest endeavours of 
governments to actively use water markets and the ongoing proclivity of 
agencies to instead embark on public projects under the guise of water use 
efficiency (see, for example Watson 2008).   
 
This paper focuses specifically on water buyback and traces recent policy 
episodes in this context.  The paper also offers details of alternative market 
instruments which have the potential to improve on the current, relatively 
fragmented arrangements.  We use contemporary examples to test the 
efficacy of alternative buyback instruments in the hope of informing policy 
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The transformation of water policy in the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia 
over the past 20 years is instructive on many fronts, particularly for those with 
an interest in seeing political economy at work.  If nothing else, the previous 
two decades of policy formulation have poignantly illustrated the intractable 
nature of reallocating resources once governments have assigned (or implied) 
liberal use rights.  Arguably, the ‘developmentalist’ ethos that typified water 
policy for most of the twentieth century has now manifested in a series of path 
dependencies that would challenge even the wiliest political player.   
 
Amongst the most instructive barometers of the changing water policy 
landscape has been the modified conceptualisations of market instruments as 
a vehicle for clawing back water extractions.  Initially judged by politicians as 
‘not on the table’, the direct purchase of water rights by governments has now 
become an important element for shoring up environmental claims.  And yet 
this has not happened overnight and the recasting of ‘buyback’ has moved 
through several phases.  Currently water buyback is overtly claimed as a 
virtuous instrument aimed at “boost[ing] the overall health of rivers and 
wetlands that are extremely stressed after years of over-allocation, drought 
and climate change” (Wong 2008).  This view was not always held and, 
notwithstanding the enthusiasm evident in recent pronouncements, we argue 
that the status and application of buyback warrants closer scrutiny.  
 
This paper is used to outline the progress of water buyback in the Murray-
Darling Basin between the initial CoAG reforms of 1994 and the most recent 
policy episodes.  The aim of the paper is not simply to provide a historical 
account of the political economy of water buyback over this period.  Rather, 
the ambition is to point towards some of the continuing challenges and 
potential mechanisms for resolving them.  Moreover, we argue there is still 
some way to go before Australian governments can claim to have met their 
1994 commitment to allocate water in line with the Agricultural and Resource 
Management Council of Australia and New Zealand [ARMCANZ] and 
Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council 
[ANZECC] National Principles for the Provision of Water for Ecosystems (see, 
NCC 1994). 
 
The paper itself is organised into five main parts.  In section two we trace the 
development of water buyback as a component of the policy framework.  A 
synoptic overview of the contemporary status of buyback is then presented in 
section three.  The fourth section is used to highlight some of the limitations 
with the existing policy approach and identify areas where improvement may 
occur.  This is undertaken in the context of a specific case site in the Ovens 
Valley of Victoria before offering some brief concluding remarks in section 
five.     
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The Transformation of Water Buyback 1994 - 2008 
1994 Water Reform Framework 
Observers of water policy in Australia point to a number of significant reform 
episodes.  Notwithstanding the progressive realisation throughout the 1980s 
that the Australian water economy had ‘matured’ (Randall 1980), the Council 
of Australian Governments (CoAG) pronouncements on water reform in 1994 
represent a significant milestone in their own right.  The 1994 Water Reform 
Framework embodied five key principles encompassing: modifications to 
pricing practices such that water prices reflected cost; introduction of two-part 
tariffs where practicable; separation of regulatory and water management 
functions; a commitment that all future infrastructure investments would meet 
economic and environmental criteria, and; the development of volumetric 
water allocations that were to be tradeable and such that they made 
allowance for ecological needs.  Importantly, as part of their commitment to 
the last of these principles, governments undertook to provide water for 
ecosystems in a manner consistent with the underlying principles prescribed 
by ARMCANZ/ANZECC.  Principles 2, 4 and 5 are particularly relevant in the 
current context and are reproduced below for convenience: 
 
Principle 2: Provision of water for ecosystems should be on the basis of 
the best scientific information available on the water regimes necessary 
to sustain the ecological values of water dependent ecosystems. 
 
Principle 4: In systems where there are existing users, provision of 
water for ecosystems should go as far as possible to meet the water 
regime necessary to sustain the ecological values of aquatic 
ecosystems whilst recognising the existing rights of other water users 
 
Principle 5: Where environmental water requirements cannot be met 
due to existing uses, action (including reallocation) should be taken to 
meet environmental needs (Sustainable Land and Water Resources 
Management Committee Subcommittee on Water Resources 1996, pp. 
7-9 – emphasis added). 
 
These deceptively straight forward principles embody substantial practical and 
political challenges, particularly where the quantum and timing of current 
water extractions challenge even modest benchmarks for environmental 
sustainability.  Perhaps not surprisingly then, relatively little ‘real water’ was 
made available over the next decade to meet these ambitious environmental 
objectives.   Rather, most progress had focussed on modifications to 
legislation and the development of planning processes, all of which attracted 
financial reward from the Commonwealth since the 1994 CoAG arrangements 
brought water reform under the ambit of National Competition Policy and its 
related funding tranches.   The status of progress against the environmental 
principles by 2005 is summarised in Table 1.  4 
 
 
Table 1: Progress against delivering environmental objectives by jurisdiction (Source: Adapted from NCC 2004)
Jurisdiction (Legislation/ proposed legislation)  Consideration for the Environment 
NSW  
(Water Management Act 2000) 
Prima facie, the environment has prior right over consumptive use; 
Water for environmental purposes is  ascribed in water sharing plans; 
36 water sharing plans have been gazetted for major rivers and groundwater systems; 
There remains some doubt whether the plans allocate sufficient water for the environment (NCC 2005, p. 3). 
Victoria  
(White paper – Securing our water future 2004 to replace Water Act 1989 
and Water – Irrigation farm dams Act 2002) 
Bulk entitlement for the environment established in 19 of 25 water supply systems; 
Rehabilitation plans in place for 5 of 11 stressed and over-allocated river systems identified in 1999 and White Paper identifies a timetable 
for development of others; 
Volumes assigned to the environment subject to review by an independent Technical Audit Panel to ensure plans are based on supporting 
science; 
White Paper foreshadows the establishment of an environmental reserve with a defined entitlement; 
Introduction of an environmental contribution by water users (5% payable by urban water authorities immediately, 2.5% payable by irrigators 
and to be phased in).  
South Australia (Water Resources Act 1997 and Land Management Bill 
2004) 
Planning for environmental needs is based on a water planning hierarchy, ranging from the State Water Plan at the top to Catchment Water 
Management Plans and optional Local Water Management Plans at the bottom; 
Water allocation plans have been developed for all 15 prescribed water resource areas identified in 1999; 
Additional plans have been developed as the need has arisen; 
The planning framework allows for the monitoring of environmental demands for water and permits a reduction in consumptive use without 
compensation.    
Tasmania (Water Management Act 1999)  Establishment of a state-wide Water Development Plan; 
Specific allocations of water for environmental purposes have been identified – minimum flows on basis of Water Management Plans – 
although the use of ‘community values’ to set environmental thresholds prevents rigorous assessment of trade-offs; 
Since 1999, 43 of the 45 environmental water assessments have been completed and the implementation of the Great Forester catchment 
plan has led to streamlining of processes. 
 
Queensland (Water Act 2000)  Water Allocation and Management Plans have been developed to establish the balance between environmental, social and economic 
demands and these are to be executed through Resource Operation Plans; 
By the end of 2004, the state had completed only 3 of the 19 Resource Operation Plans for the systems identified in the 1999 CoAG 
implementation program; 
Independent scientific reviews have been used in some cases to inform Resource Operation Plans; 
In some cases (e.g. Fitzroy and Boyne Basins) safeguards within the Act can be used to vary resource allocation to meet environmental flow 
objectives  
Western Australia (Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 and its recent 
amendments; State Water Strategy Irrigation review 2005) 
A total of 41 water planning areas are identified in Western Australia; 
By 2005 around two-thirds of these plans were expected to be complete; 
Recognized environmental water assessment methods have not been used to establish some plans and adequate record keeping to 
underpin planning has been found wanting in some agencies; 
Renewed effort to resolve these matters has come from the Department of Environment following the amalgamation of the Department of 
Environmental Protection and the Water and Rivers Commission.  
Northern Territory (Water Act 1992)  Water planning occurs as part of the Territory’s integrated resource management process; 
Currently, six water control districts have been declared: Darwin rural, Katherine, Gove, Tennant Creek, Ti-Tree and Alice Springs; 
The water management strategy for Ti-Tree has been completed and three others were scheduled for completion in 2005; 
Notwithstanding some debate about the robustness of some of the science used to develop this strategy, the NCC has concluded that the 
process adequately accounts for the needs of the environment. 
 
Australian Capital Territory 
(Water Resources Act 1998) 
A Water Resources Management Plan is developed under Environmental Flow Guidelines before any consumptive use allowances are made; 
Plans are made at the sub-catchment level; 
Planning for all 32 sub-catchment and groundwater has been completed.  
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It is also informative to briefly consider how the state jurisdictions were 
considering the issue of reallocation (i.e. Principle 5) during this phase.   In 
Victoria, for example, the Government released its White Paper titled Securing 
Our Water Future Together in June 2004.  The stated environmental 
aspiration of the Victorian government at that time was “to have healthy rivers, 
floodplains, estuaries and catchments” (DSE 2004, p. 38).  The principal 
means of achieving this was via the establishment of Environmental Water 
Reserves for each of Victoria’s river systems.  Where over-allocation was 
already apparent, the level of each Reserve was to be set in a manner that 
was consistent with the principles of adaptive management and by applying 
the precautionary principle (DSE 2004, p. 44-47).  Arguably, this would appear 
not to deal directly with the thorny issue of reallocating water.   
 
On a more practical note, the reforms in Victoria resulted in what was formerly 
termed ‘sales water’ (i.e. a low reliability access right) being converted to a 
tradable right, of which 20 percent was then administratively assigned to the 
Environmental Reserve with the residual accruing to irrigators.  Other 
measures envisaged as building the Environmental Reserve included 
“practical restoration measures” like decommissioning Lake Mokoan, funding 
of water use efficiency in irrigation, investing in infrastructure to reduce 
distribution losses, donations and the substitution of recycled water of suitable 
quality.  At this point markets and buyback were mooted as possible options 
although the government was keen to point out that it was “aware of the 
potential socio-economic side-effects” of this approach and emphasised that 
its main criteria was to “as far as possible …provide long-term, environmental, 
social and/or industry benefits” (DSE 2004, p. 49).  Interestingly, relatively little 
was made of the need for economic efficiency in delivering these outcomes. 
 
In sum, the response to the original CoAG framework was characterised by 
variable progress across state jurisdictions and a heavy emphasis on planning 
and the development of legislation and administrative processes.  
Commitment to noble philosophies was clear but relatively limited delivery of 
fungible water to satisfy environmental claimants actually occurred.  The 
prospect of purchasing water rights to achieve environmental ends had 
received some policy attention although this was far from the preferred 
response.  When water was being assigned to an Environmental Reserve, it 
often had inferior claims – say in the form of converted sales water in Victoria.  
Moreover, at this point there was (and remains) little evidence to suggest that 
the Environmental Reserve was itself being considered in any other form than 
a volume of water, where more Gigalitres were seen to crudely equated to 
greater environmental benefits.    
 
The Living Murray 
Before moving to consider how buyback has evolved as part of subsequent 
rounds of CoAG, it is worth noting that other policy initiatives were 
circumscribing the water reform agenda at this time.  In response to growing 
concerns about the environmental health of the River Murray, the Murray-
Darling Basin Ministerial Council released its Living Murray discussion paper 
in July 2002.  The discussion focused on three main reference points, (350, 
750 and 1500 Gigalitres) again specified solely in terms of a volume of water   6
to be allocated to satisfy ecosystem needs.  After a tortuous consultative 
process (see, Crase, Dollery and Wallis 2005) the MDBMC settled on 
reallocating 500 Gigalitres as a first step to restoring the ecological health of 
the River Murray.  This outcome was heavily influenced by the Federal 
government with the Prime Minister of the day announcing that $500 million 
would be allocated to address the declining health of the River Murray.  Each 
of the southern jurisdictions agreed to contribute to the 500 Gigalitre target 
with the majority being sourced from New South Wales (249 Gigalitres) and 
Victoria (214 Gigalitres).    
 
As with progress against the CoAG water reforms, the achievements of the 
Living Murray initiative vary across states.  For instance, by July 2008 the 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission was reporting that 133 Gigalitres of water 
had been ‘recovered’, most of this being attributed to Victoria (120 Gigalitres).  
New South Wales had ‘recovered’ no water at all, although projects expected 
to yield 237 Gigalitres were listed as ‘ready for implementation’ and a further 
30 Gigalitres was attributed to projects that were ‘under investigation’.  Again, 
the definition of environmental restoration in the Living Murray is distinguished 
almost exclusively in volumetric terms.  The mechanisms by which various 
water products are accounted for is also somewhat opaque and variable.  For 
example, the legislatively-converted sales water in Victoria, which 
coincidentally equates to the entire 120 Gigalitres claimed to have been 
‘recovered’ in that state, needs to be meaningfully comparable with a range of 
other ‘recovery’ mechanisms.  In this context, the reconfiguration of irrigation 
systems in the Goulburn-Murray irrigation district will purportedly yield 25 
Gigalitres of water for the Living Murray.  It is not at all clear how these 25 
Gigalitres which derive from ‘water use efficiency’ measures, that are 
themselves of questionable status, will ultimately stack up against those 
Gigalitres sourced by legislative fiat
1.  A similar question circumscribes the 
status of different water products purchased from the market. 
 
In 2008 the Living Murray Initiative had three projects focussed on purchasing 
water on the market and which met the criteria for the Eligible Measures 
Register.  The projects were anticipated to yield up to 195 Gigalitres of water 
and were viewed by jurisdictions as being “essential if the Living Murray 
Initiative is to reach its volumetric and financial targets” (NWC 2008, p. 12).  
Clearly, buyback was being acknowledged as a realistic means of dealing with 
the reallocation issue in the context of the Living Murray project by this time, 
and yet there remains considerable doubt about the sincerity with which it is 
being managed, which we deal with later in the paper.   
 
2004 National Water Initiative 
The earlier description of the initial CoAG reforms suggests that limited real 
progress was evident against the key environmental principles embodied 
almost a decade after reaching consensus on the 1994-95 agreement.  This 
was in no small part due to the political difficulties associated with reallocating 
water and left most jurisdictions selecting options considered more politically 
                                                 
1 For a review of the logical flaws with water use efficiency see, for example, Crase and O’Keefe 
(2009).  An explanation of the water accounting used to convert TLM water to a common metric is 
scrutinised later in this paper.   7
feasible – modifying administrative, planning and consultation processes 
and/or using public monies to purportedly ‘create’ water via difficult-to-quantify 
water use efficiency measures. 
 
However, increased enthusiasm for water reform emerged in 2004 when 
CoAG settled on the National Water Initiative.  The National Water Initiative 
sought to resolve some of the more vexing issues that had emerged from the 
earlier reform agenda.  More specifically, the Initiative sought to harmonise 
the property rights structure for water access by having all jurisdictions define 
rights as a share of a variable consumptive pool.  Risks were also to be more 
clearly specified and, importantly in the current context, integrated 
management of water for environmental purposes was foreshadowed (NWC 
2005).  The specific outcomes expected to emerge from this element of the 
National Water Initiative were fourfold.  First, there was an expectation that 
environmental and public benefit would be “identified with as much specificity 
as possible”.  Second, management and institutional arrangements were to be 
put in place to realise those environmental outcomes.  Third, environmental 
water managers were to be given adequate “authority and resources” to meet 
the environmental objectives ascribed in planning documents.  Fourth, there 
were to be “cost effective measures to provide water for environmental 
outcomes” (NWC 2008, p. 11). 
 
To manage the National Water Initiative the 2004 CoAG reforms ratified the 
formation of the National Water Commission.  In September 2004 the Prime 
Minister also announced the establishment of a $2 Billion Australian 
Government Water Fund with the lion’s share ($1.6 Billion) dedicated to the 
Water Smart Australia Program which aimed primarily to “accelerate the 
uptake of smart technologies and practices in water use across Australia 
…[with most support] directed to practical on-the-ground projects” (NWC 
2005, s1-1).  Very limited financial support was foreshadowed for buyback at 
this time with most emphasis given to supporting “improvements in irrigation 
infrastructure”, or activities that “advance efficiency improvements on on-farm 
water use”, or “develop water efficient housing design” (NWC 2005, s2-1).  
This was arguably at odds with the overarching desire to have “cost effective 
measures to provide water for environmental outcomes” (NWC 2008, p. 11) 
since it was widely acknowledged at the time that the market purchase of 
water from willing sellers was the most cost effective mechanism for 
recovering water (see, for instance, ACIL Tasman 2003; Crase, Byrnes and 
Dollery 2007; Watson 2007; Quiggin 2006).   
 
In reviewing the progress of jurisdictions against the requirement to comply 
with the principles for water recovery to achieve environmental outcomes, the 
National Water Commission (2008, p. A30) subsequently reported that most 
states had “substantially completed” this action.  Poignantly and in the context 
of water buyback, New South Wales was noted as “having a range of water 
recovery programs being progressed with Commonwealth support, including 
infrastructure and market based” mechanisms.  Victoria was considered to be 
in a position to have “strategies dealing with environmental water … 
completed by 2009”.  South Australia was also rated as having “substantially 
completed” this task and it was specifically observed that this state “supports   8
and utilises market options to recover water”.  Arguably, in the jurisdictions 
with the most expansive irrigation sectors the National Water Commission 
would appear to have substantially modified its views on the acceptability of 
water buyback by 2008.  Nevertheless, on a more cautionary note the 
Commission continued to observe that “selecting the most appropriate 
mechanisms for water recovery is a complex and challenging task with 
important economic and social dimensions in addition to the environmental 
requirements” (NWC 2008, p. 12).  Perhaps the Commission is not yet 
completely convinced that the reallocation Principles agreed to in the early 
CoAG agenda require the forthright and coordinated use of market 
instruments – a view not shared by the authors.  
 
National Plan for Water Security   
The National Plan for Water Security was amongst the final policy 
declarations of the Howard government and was released in January 2007.  
The Plan attracted scathing criticism from some quarters, having emerged in a 
manner that seemed to reflect the political concerns of the time more than the 
environmental demands of the Murray-Darling Basin.  Watson (2007, p. 1) 
noted that the authors of the Plan were “not claiming spurious accuracy for 
their major proposals.  As subsequently emerged, the ten-point Plan to spend 
$10 Billion over ten years was prepared in haste, well away from the 
troublesome gaze of Treasury and Finance officials and the experienced eye 
of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission”.    
 
The Plan overtly supported buyback of water insomuch as it assigned an 
unspecified portion of the proposed expenditures earmarked for addressing 
over-allocation in the Murray-Darling Basin ($3 Billion) to buyback.  
Nevertheless, greatest emphasis was still given to alternative policy 
approaches in the form of “assistance to irrigation districts to reconfigure 
irrigation systems and retire non-viable areas” along with measures “to help 
relocate non-viable or inefficient irrigators, or help them with exiting the 
industry” (Howard 2007, p. 4).  This was in addition to the $6 Billion already 
specified in the Plan for modernizing irrigation at taxpayer expense.  In a more 
tepid tone, it was suggested that “where necessary, entitlements will also be 
purchased on the market” (Howard 2007, p. 4).   
 
One of the major legacies of the Plan was the Commonwealth Water Act 2007 
which sought the ceding of state powers over water resources in the Murray-
Darling Basin to the Federal government.  After considerable political 
maneuvering, all states finally agreed to relinquish control over the Basin’s 
water resources in March 2008.  Greatest resistance to the Act emanated 
from Victoria and it came as little surprise that Victoria’s eventual agreement 
coincided with the decision by the Commonwealth to co-fund Stage Two of 
the Food Bowl Modernisation Project in Victoria’s Goulburn Valley.  This is 
estimated to cost Australian taxpayers up to $1 Billion (CoAG 2008a, p. 7) and 
is in addition to the funding garnered from the state government via increased 
water charges to be borne by Melbournians.  
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Water for the Future   
In April 2008 the recently elected Rudd Government announced its Water for 
the Future manifesto.  The policy committed the government to spending 
almost $13 Billion over ten years via “investment in strategic water priorities; 
sound water governance and policy; and renewed purpose and commitment 
in water reform” (Wong 2008b, p. 4).  Reminiscent of earlier proclamations like 
the Howard Government’s National Plan for Water Security, the policy is 
heavily skewed towards the ‘modernisation’ of irrigation at taxpayer expense.  
More than $5.8 Billion was assigned to “investment towards improving the 
efficiency and productivity of water use and management” (Wong 2008, p. 9).  
 
Notwithstanding the similar enthusiasm for spurious engineering ‘fixes’ 
embodied in the  Howard government’s Plan and the Rudd government’s 
policy, the pronouncements on buyback were prima facie more forthright.  In 
this context Wong (2008b, p. 14) plainly announced that the government “will 
be purchasing water to put back in the rivers”.  The budgetary allocation for 
this activity was to be in excess of $3 Billion and was foreshadowed as being 
complementary to the infrastructure programs and other earlier commitments 
made under the Living Murray program and the Snowy initiative.    
 
On the basis of these recent declarations proponents of buyback could be 
forgiven for feeling cautiously optimistic.  After all, buyback programs have 
clearly moved on from having been initially conceived as the least preferred 
political alternative in the early phases of reform.  They would also appear to 
have surpassed the phase where they received lukewarm support with 
relatively undefined budgets and almost begrudging acceptance of their policy 
usefulness.  Finally, there appeared to be some enthusiasm for buyback 
programs with a defined budget allocation, albeit less than the sum assigned 
for subsidising irrigation infrastructure.  Surely, this would become an 
important vehicle for restoring balance in over-allocated systems in the 
Murray-Darling Basin.       
 
An Overview of the Status of Water Buyback in the Southern Murray-
Darling Basin 
In the previous section we noted that the status of water reform generally 
varies across state jurisdictions.  This is no different for water buyback 
programs, although buyback is also complicated by programs developed and 
managed under the auspices of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission and 
the recently established Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder.  To 
shed some light on buyback we briefly summarise the publicly available data 
on some of these programs but specifically focus on activities in New South 
Wales and Victoria and the Commonwealth’s water buybacks.  We 
acknowledge that other buyback programs have operated in the Basin, such 
as the pilot program operated by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission in 
2007 and the earlier activities of Water for Rivers.  However, we restrict our 
discussion to contemporary programs in the interest of brevity.  
 
RiverBank 
The New South Wales government established RiverBank in 2005 as its 
designated purchaser of water in order to address the deterioration of   10
wetlands and river systems.  State level funding for the initial components of 
RiverBank’s work derived from taxes levied on hard waste disposal to landfill 
in Sydney
2 (set at about $100 Million) and the Commonwealth also provided 
additional funding ($72 Million).  The program purportedly seeks to target 
specific sites in the first instance, such as the Macquarie Marshes, Lowbidgee 
Wetlands and Narran Lakes.  The goals and objectives specified in the 
Program Plan 2006-2011 focus predominantly on environmental, cultural and 
business outcomes (DECC 2008a) although the extent to which this then 
translates into annual targets and activities is less clear.  For example, the 
2008-09 Annual Plan traces indicative investment targets - measured in terms 
of the total dollars expended (see, DECC 2008b p. 2) - but the Plan is less 
clear on the actual achievement of environmental targets.  RiverBank water 
was first used in April 2008 to support a bird breeding event in the Macquarie 
Marshes.  This amounted to the modest release of 693 Megalitres to 
accompany an 8,000 Megalitre release as part of the Macquarie-Cudgegong 
Water Sharing Plan.  Regrettably, there appears to be no mechanism for 
tracing the effectiveness of the use of the resource in this or other contexts 
that would allow for an ongoing assessment of the cost effectiveness of 
achieving environmental impacts. 
 
Although the Program Plan leaves open the possibility of employing a number 
of acquisition methods, most licences to date have been acquired using an 
expression of interest (EOI) process.  The published criteria upon which EOIs 
have been assessed include the size of the licence; restrictions that pertain to 
a licence; the price per unit share; and the type of licence (DECC 2008c).  
Reference is made in the RiverBank Planning documentation to a range of 
other criteria which may be invoked to rank the water that is on offer, such as 
the “opportunities for enhancing the current environmental water rules with 
additional flows” and “potential for strategic alliances” (DECC 2008a, p. 13).  
However, it is not at all clear how each of these is rated by the agency in the 
context of specific bids.   
 
In 2008 RiverBank also acted as the single purchasing desk for the New 
South Wales component of the Living Murray Initiative and all other water 
buyback programs in the state.  This adds some confusion to the activities of 
RiverBank insomuch as the Living Murray Initiative purportedly aims to target 
different environmental sites to those specified in RiverBank’s original 
planning.  This is further complicated by the fact that the criteria by which ‘new 
environmental water’ [new e-water] are assessed under the Living Murray 
should differ from that used for RiverBank’s targeted environmental assets.  
To illustrate this point it is necessary to understand some of the administrative 
accounting measures in place to track progress in the Living Murray Initiative. 
 
Earlier we noted that the Living Murray Initiative was a cross-jurisdictional 
agreement where states agreed collectively to return a total of 500 Gigalitres 
of water to the River Murray.  This relatively simple policy goal belies the 
complexities of water accounting and, as we will see, it is these complexities 
that can encourage perverse outcomes.  Since each jurisdiction has specified 
                                                 
2 Economists would invariably struggle to rationalise the efficiency impacts of these arrangements.   11
its water entitlements in different forms, a volumetric measure in one state is 
not always equivalent to that in others.  Even within jurisdictions there will be 
non-trivial differences that reflect the reliability with which a given volume of 
water can be accessed in a given location.  For example, New South Wales 
has three main categories of water access licences or water products.  High 
security products have a fixed and relatively secure volume of water where 
the frequency, timing and delivery are largely controlled by the licence holder.  
General security products vary in volume depending on seasonal conditions 
and inflows to storages.  Annual allocations for general security licences only 
accrue once higher claims (e.g. high security holders) have been met, 
although release and control of the allocation is largely at the discretion of the 
licence holder.  The lowest priority accrues to supplementary access products.  
Here, magnitude, frequency and timing of access are all subject to specific 
declarations – say in the event of a very high flow in a stream (DECC 2008a, 
p. 17).   In simple terms a Gigalitre of high security water is not the same as a 
Gigalitre of supplementary access water and a mechanism is required to 
convert these to a common metric since the Living Murray Initiative has 
specified the objective in a single volumetric measure - 500 Gigalitres.      
 
The Murray-Darling Basin Commission has developed a number of Living 
Murray Business Plans approved by the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial 
Council.  Despite the use of some rather daunting terminology, the Business 
plans provide insights into how this methodology has evolved over time and 
the implications for water buyback.  At the core of the issue is the calculation 
of what is termed ‘long term cap equivalent’ [LTCE] water.  The LTCE is the 
volume of water calculated using the best practice modelling of the Cap on 
extractions to determine the long term contribution of the ‘water parcel’ to the 
Cap or its “potential contribution to long term average flows in the relevant 
river valley” (MDBC 2005, p. 49).  In essence, what this process attempts to 
do is capture and control for the variability that attends different water 
products and reduce it to an ‘average’ contribution to flows. 
 
There are three potential limitations to this approach that need to be kept in 
mind.  First, the modelling that is used in this instance is not a precise science 
and if future predictions of climate change prove accurate, the impacts on the 
actual water availability seem likely to be significant.  More specifically, the 
estimated volumes generated by the LTCE method rely heavily on historic 
data relating to yield and rainfall.  Thus, low surety products like 
supplementary access licences, may well yield very little, if any, water in the 
future as the frequency of high flow events decrease with climate change.  
There is no evidence that this has been deliberately included in the LTCE 
calculations or the manner in which agencies have considered buyback 
options presented as part of the Living Murray.  Moreover, this must surely 
shed some doubt on the usefulness of low reliability products in achieving the 
prescribed environmental outcomes. 
 
Second, whilst administratively convenient, when deployed as the sole metric 
the LTCE approach potentially increases the focus on the volume of water as 
a policy objective in its own right.  Ecological systems are far more complex 
than this and the environmental health of any stream will be influenced by a   12
range of ecological and hydrological factors, not just the volume of water.  
Hillman (2009) summarises a number of these dimensions such as the 
differing classes of flow and water temperature, for example.  Put simply, the 
purported volume of water at the disposal of an environmental manager 
appears to have become the sole de facto environmental metric in many 
instances.  The upshot is that agencies may be buying water products (which 
may or may not ever deliver a flow) on the basis of volume and the link 
between the purchase and environmental restoration is weakened as a result   
 
Third, notwithstanding the collaborative façade of programs like the Living 
Murray, strong rivalries remain between states and their water bureaucracies.  
Against this backdrop, the determination of the LTCE for different water 
products has the potential to take on a political dimension in spite of the 
insistence that the LTCE “in itself does not represent a policy position” (MDBC 
2005, p. 49).  After all, if a jurisdiction can influence the LTCE calculation such 
that a relatively low value product in their state is granted a generous LTCE 
then that state can claim to have met its obligations to recover water but limit 
the economic and political costs of redistribution.   
 
A review of the LTCE (Cap Factor) over a number of years shows that in 2005 
the parties to the Living Murray were aware that its configuration at that point 
did “not encourage the purchase of supplementary allocations as its long term 
Cap equivalent may reduce over time” (MDBC 2005, p. 52).  Nevertheless, by 
2007 a Cap Factor of 0.37
3 had been assigned to Lower Darling 
Supplementary Licences in New South Wales providing some incentive for 
their purchase
4.   
 
Against this background the New South Wales Department of Environment 
and Climate Change announced in November 2008 that it was “ahead of the 
pack on environmental water” (DECC 2008c, p. 1) having purchased 23 
Gigalitres of supplementary access licence from Tandou Limited.  The press 
release from the Department proudly proclaimed that this single purchase 
“represent[ed] almost one tenth of NSW’s water recovery target” making a 
representative of the Department “confident that it is on track to achieve its 
share of the program by 30 June 2009” (DECC 2008d, p. 1).  Given the 
aforementioned caveats about the calculation of the volume of water that 
attends this $34 million purchase and the doubt over the environmental 
outcomes that it might deliver, a more circumspect response might have been 
expected.  Attending the press conference that accompanied the press 
release the Minister was reportedly quizzed “about the benefits of the 
purchase, given the savings would only be realised in big wet years when the 
environment would be receiving a big drink anyway” (Skulthorp 2008).  The 
Minister reportedly justified the expenditure on the grounds that “‘times are 
tough’ for companies like Tandou” (Skulthorp 2008) although apparently not 
                                                 
3 The higher the Cap Factor the more Gigalitres the state can claim to have purchased for the 
environment.  High security products have Cap Factors of 1.0 or higher. 
4 No Cap Factor was specified for supplementary licenses in the Darling in New South Wales in 2005 
and the documentation notes that the published Cap Factors for 2007 were revised and “agreed by 
jurisdictions at 15 Sept 2006” implying a partially negotiated process at least (MDBC 2007, p. 59).   13
so tough that it could be persuaded to part with any of its general or high 
security water products.   
 
In sum, there appear to be some grounds for questioning the link between the 
water products being purchased by RiverBank and the environmental 
objectives assigned to the Living Murray and the other state-based 
environmental programs for which RiverBank acts.  There would also appear 
to be grounds for greater scrutiny of the range of political and administrative 
influences that may come to bear in these cases since there is potential for 
these to substantially undermine the efficacy of the buyback approach.        
 
DEWHA Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder 
Earlier we noted that the Water for the Future manifesto announced the 
Commonwealth government’s intention to allocate about $3 Billion to 
purchase water over five years.  In February 2008 the Minister declared that 
the first allocation of funding was set at $50 Million and purchases were to be 
completed by the end of June 2008.   Funding was also announced for the 
following three years ranging from $157 Million to be spent in 2008-09 to $468 
Million for purchases in 2010-11.  At the completion of the first round $47.1 
Million had been expended and 34.3 Gigalitres of water product purchased 
(Breckwoldt 2008).   
 
Like the RiverBank model, the DEWHA process requires the seller to submit a 
non-binding EOI with offers then being assessed by DEWHA on the basis of 
‘value for money’.  To help guide the process DEWHA reportedly employs two 
principles to help prioritise purchases.  These are: 
•  “The availability of the water for regular allocation to high and medium 
priority environmental assets such as wetlands that have been 
significantly adversely affected by water extractions 
•  The extent to which the withdrawal of the water from the regular 
allocation to irrigators will improve the overall health of the catchment 
from which it is taken and/or the Murray-Darling system as a whole” 
Breckwoldt (2008, p. 7).     
 
The combined impact of these principles was that the first round of DEWHA 
buyback focussed on water that could be delivered to ‘priority assets’, being 
limited to Ramsar wetlands; those wetlands listed in the Directory of Important 
Wetlands in Australia; ecosystems supporting listed threatened species and; 
those migratory birds and communities listed as being threatened.  This 
manifested in a purchasing strategy that sought water entitlements from the 
Murray and its tributaries downstream of Menindee Lakes and the regulated 
portions of the Lachlan, Macquarie and Gwydir Rivers.  At the time DEWHA 
acknowledged that purchases of water from other catchment areas of the 
Darling had the potential to deliver benefits, but the unregulated nature of 
these entitlements and the conditions that attended them
5 made purchase 
                                                 
5 In essence, there is no way of using these water products to deliver water to an environmental asset 
since, under current conditions, it is not possible to prevent downstream irrigators from then extracting 
the passing flow, given the nature of the licences.    14
“much lower priority compared to the catchments indentified above” 
(Breckwoldt 2008, p. 7). 
Notwithstanding these criteria, DEWHA and the New South Wales 
government attracted considerable attention when they publicly announced 
the purchased of Toorale Station, located at the junction of the Darling and 
Warrego Rivers slightly downstream of Bourke
6.  The primary motivation of 
the $24 Million deal was to deliver “a significant boost to environmental flows 
in the Darling River, whilst also providing a boost to the NSW reserve system” 
(Wong and Tebbutt 2008, p. 1).  The water products that came with the 
purchase were announced as being equivalent to 20 Gigalitres per year
7 
(Wong and Tebbutt 2008, p.1), although former National Party leader and 
director of the firm that until recently owned the property had a more jaundiced 
view.  In an interview with ABC television Mr. Anderson noted that “Toorale 
hasn't grown anything for years because there hasn't been any water” and 
"that unless everything's going to turn around and we're suddenly going to get 
reliable water flows again ... I'm afraid what the taxpayer's actually bought is 
air" (ABC 2008, p. 1).   
Whilst it might be expected that former political adversaries would differ on 
this point, this case again highlights the urgent need for a clearer link between 
the purchasing strategy employed in buyback and the environmental 
objectives ascribed in the policy.   In the context of the first phase of the 
DEWHA buyback program proper, which comprised mostly general security 
products purchases from preferred catchments, Breckwoldt (2008, p. 72) 
urges similar action: 
“The evaluation of future purchases will be difficult without clarification 
of the goals and objectives of the water purchasing program through 
specification of the required water regimes.  The Environmental Water 
Plan should drive acquisition of water as soon as possible.  There is a 
need to clarify targets to support the overall goal of water for the 
environment.  The objectives and targets of the Basin Plan need to be 
clarified and then used consistently” 
In a more general context the NWC has expressed similar reservations about 
the slow progress against those components of the National Water Initiative 
that relate to integrated management of water for the environment.  One of the 
key priorities identified in this field is to “undertake an evaluation of the cost-
effectiveness and environmental-effectiveness of the various recovery 
mechanisms in the Murray-Darling Basin including an examination of any 
overlap and duplication among programs” (NWC 2008, p. 13). 
 
Streamflow tenders in Victoria 
The Victorian government has invested substantial resources in the 
development of Regional Sustainable Water Strategies with the first of these 
                                                 
6 For those unfamiliar with the geography of the Basin, this area is well upstream of the Menindee 
Lakes and in the region specified by DEWHA as being of a lower priority for buyback. 
7 Presumably this was the result of a LTCE calculation, although data on this issue are difficult to 
derive.   15
being released in October 2006.  These strategies cover water resources in a 
defined area and provided part of the impetus for the development of 
streamflow management plans that detail the sharing arrangements for 
streams.  In essence, streamflow management plans specify a minimum flow 
regime to sustain or improve the ecological health of rivers.  In order to 
achieve this flow, limitations are placed on the amount and timing of 
extractions.  For example, in summer months irrigators may be placed on a 
rotation that limits when they can withdraw water or banned from extracting 
water entirely, depending on flow conditions. 
 
Streamflow management plans provide for a staged modification to water 
extractions over several years.  However, in order to accelerate progress 
towards the achievement of streamflow targets, the government conducted a 
pilot tender process for the Olinda, Stringybark, Pauls, Steels and Dixons 
Creeks in mid-2007.  The streamflow tender involved licence holders offering 
to modify the conditions that attend their licences in return for financial 
assistance.  This reduced to two main offers from irrigators – agreement to 
reduce the volume of their licence and/or agreement to cease extractions 
when streamflow reached a predetermined trigger. 
 
The tender process was managed by Melbourne Water with the broad 
criterion of ‘value for money’ stipulated as the basis for tender assessment 
(Melbourne Water 2007a, p. 1).  Closer inspection of the tender forms would 
suggest that the three areas of concern were the extent to which the bid would 
contribute to environmental flows, the bid price and the rapidity with which 
changes would be made (see, Melbourne Water 2007b, p. 1).   Whilst a 
review of the tender was proposed, it has yet to be released.  Nevertheless, 
the Department of Sustainability and Environment reports mixed success with 
some farmers proving more enthusiastic than others and a modest 55 
Megalitres being relinquished as part of the tender (DSE 2008, p. 323). 
 
Streamflow tenders have one important advantage over volumetric EOIs 
insomuch as there is potential to more clearly specify the environmental 
impacts of a water buyback relative to using a volumetric recovery target.  
Here there is scope to at least account for the timing of flows in order to 
address the most significant environmental stresses.  However, there are 
other perverse outcomes that need to be considered.  First, the purchaser 
needs to be assured that the actions on offer will actually deliver against the 
streamflow target.  This will be particularly problematic if data on the history of 
use are not available or of inappropriate scale.  Under these circumstances it 
becomes possible for holders of sleeper and dozer rights to tender volumetric 
licences such that no discernable improvement on the flow target emerges.  
Obviously, this raises the overall cost of delivering the streamflow target as 
sleeper and dozer rights need to be ‘absorbed’ before any progress can be 
made against the flow target.  Second, the purchaser needs to guard against 
the myopic focus on the most pressing problem – usually summer flows – at 
the expense of generating other third party effects.  In some instances 
irrigators (and urban water utilities) have been encouraged to construct ‘winter 
fill’ storage which can then be accessed in summer to offset bans on 
extraction.  This runs the risk of ignoring the consequences of excessive   16
winter extractions and is reminiscent of earlier policy episodes when the shift 
from surface water to groundwater extraction escaped the gaze of the water 
bureaucracy
8.  Put simply, governments need to guard against paying a 
premium for permanent ‘solutions’ to over-extraction that later prove wanting 
and require additional calls on the public purse.   
 
Challenges to Buyback – An Example from the Unregulated Ovens River 
The preceding discussion points to at least two of the fundamental challenges 
facing water buyback.  Arguably, these might be classified as tests to the 
standard concepts of technical and allocative efficiency.  On the one hand, the 
problems associated with predicting the impact of a given buyback 
expenditure on fungible and deliverable water undermines the conditions 
required to gauge technical efficiency.   After all, you can hardly identify the 
lowest cost method of sourcing a volume or flow of water if there is 
considerable uncertainty circumscribing the relationship between different 
water products and the volume or flow that purportedly attends them.  On the 
other hand, the absence of a genuine environmental metric continues to 
frustrate the conventional measurement of allocative efficiency.  Even if water 
was being purchased at lowest cost, it may still fail to deliver the required 
environmental outcome unless it has the necessary delivery characteristics.  
As noted earlier, this is likely to be particular problematic when there is a 
strong focus on a volumetric metric at the expense of all other considerations, 
like the nuances of flow, and vaguely defined environmental outcomes.  Using 
this broad approach we now briefly examine a water buyback program 
mooted for the unregulated portion of the Ovens Valley in Victoria.  Our aim is 
to highlight the technical and allocative complications, even though the 
allocative component is less problematic since the environmental outcomes 
are more clearly linked to flow rather than volume.  This analysis tentatively 
points towards potential mechanisms for improvement. 
 
The Upper Ovens Valley in northern Victoria comprises a large unregulated 
system with a substantial volume of licensed extractions for urban and 
irrigation users.  The environmental attributes of the Ovens are also highly 
prized at the State and National levels with the Lower Ovens listed as a 
Heritage River, largely because of its active floodplain and healthy native fish 
communities (Vogell et al. 2007).  A draft streamflow management plan was 
developed for the Upper Ovens in 2003 with the aim of “clarifying how much 
and when water can be harvested from the Catchment and the minimum flows 
required in streams to maintain the environmental health of waterways” (DSE 
2003, p. 9).  The greatest immediate challenge is the maintenance of 
minimum flows during dry summers when competition for the resource is 
intense.  Since this is an unregulated stream, environmental objectives are 
managed by constraining the rate at which water is extracted during times of 
                                                 
8 It is a moot point whether the radical increase witnessed in groundwater extractions was 
bureaucratically ‘unpredictable’ or simply politically expedient.  In the case of the trial Streamflow 
Tender, Melbourne Water (2007c, p. 10) lists “increasing the size of your existing off-stream dam”, 
“constructing a new groundwater bore” and “pumping from your existing groundwater bore” as 
feasible ways of increasing water availability or water use efficiency.  Accordingly, all of these 
activities potentially qualified for support from the public purse.  This would appear to be at odds with 
the dominant thinking that groundwater and surface water management should be considered jointly.    17
severe scarcity, say by restricting or banning extractions in line with ‘run of 
river’ metrics.  A further complication in this instance is the strong interaction 
between surface and groundwater which has been strengthened by gold 
dredging in the past (DSE 2003, p. 42).  
 
One of the key recommendations emerging from the draft streamflow 
management plan for the Upper Ovens was a minimum environmental water 
provision defined as a daily flow at Myrtleford of no less than 100 Megalitres.  
This broadly equated to a ban on irrigation 6 years in 10 for an average period 
of 4.5 weeks.  In the context of the current horticultural practices in the region, 
this represents a significant contraction and points to the need for substantial 
structural adjustment.  It was originally foreshadowed that the plan would 
achieve this target by the 10
th year of operation, although earlier 
implementation was seen as desirable on the proviso that “adequate 
measures to address supply reliability [could] be implemented” (DSE 2003, p. 
36).  A community consultation phase followed the release of the draft 
streamflow management plan which preceded the Minister requesting 
additional technical work prior to its ratification.  At the time of writing, no 
streamflow management plan is in place although additional work has been 
undertaken (see, for example, SKM 2006) to inform another round of 
consultation.  The more recent technical work highlights the necessity for a 
higher daily flow at Myrtleford (137 Megalitres) and thus implies even more 
radical adjustment to agricultural practices in the region.   
 
Perhaps anticipating the political costs likely to attend implementation of the 
Ovens streamflow management plan, representatives of the various state 
departments commenced discussions with landholders about the feasibility of 
a streamflow tender mechanism in mid-2008.  At the time, the model 
employed by Melbourne Water (described earlier) was being proffered as an 
option (per com Kerry Murphy December 2008).    
 
There are several significant challenges to the implementation of a tender 
instrument in this context, particularly given the deficiencies identified with 
earlier streamflow tender.  First, the total volume of licensed extraction in the 
Upper Ovens vastly exceeds average use.  More specifically, the maximum 
recorded use in the catchment was only 59% of licence volume in 2003 (DSE 
2003, p. 39).  This has non-trivial implications for the effectiveness of any EOI 
process, particularly if the buyer is unable to accurately trace history of use.  
Put simply, accurately tracing history of use is a precondition for ensuring that 
any purchase of licenses manifests in an authentic reduction in the demands 
on streamflow.   
 
The agency charged with monitoring water use in the Valley (Goulburn-Murray 
Water) has a policy of monitoring water supplies “in principle” (DSE 2003, p. 
41).  This “in principle” approach has resulted in relatively poor calibre 
historical data upon which a potential buyer might assess the environmental 
merits of purchasing different parcels of water.  For example, the 2003-04 
Water Accounts for the Ovens Valley reveal that “licenses on unregulated 
streams are not currently metered and water usage is an estimate provided by 
Goulburn-Murray Water” (DSE 2005, p. 81).  Coupled with a definition of   18
sleeper licenses as being those “which have not been used for 10 years or 
more and have no infrastructure” (DSE 2003, p. 40) it will be difficult to 
distinguish which are genuine sleeper or dozer rights from those whose 
purchase by the state would actually impact on extractions.   
 
A historical precedent has also been set that ascribes value to sleeper 
licences and “these licenses, regardless of use have a legitimate entitlement 
to water” (DSE 2003, p. 40).  This forms a second major challenge for a 
tender-based buyback in the region.  More specifically, a buyback scheme 
would prima facie need to compete with other potential purchasers of sleeper 
licences.  Historically, relatively little water has been traded in the area (see, 
for example, Watermove 2009) although it is feasible to trade water 
downstream to other defined regulated users, albeit at an exchange rate of 
1:0.81.  Whilst such trades might appear likely to benefit the streamflow target 
of maintaining water in stream at Myrtleford, the basin-wide impacts could 
prove detrimental, especially if sleeper or dozer rights are being sold and 
activated.  Thus, whilst the tender process might seek to discriminate against 
the purchase of un-activated licences or portions of licenses, there may be 
little choice other than to purchase these licenses or run the risk of their 
activation downstream.     
 
A third major consideration relates to the congruence between groundwater 
and surface water in the region and the monitoring that has historically 
attended extractions from both sources.  The floor of the Upper Ovens is 
characterised by course sediments and rocks with large quantities of 
groundwater interacting with surface flows.  Groundwater is easily accessible 
in most of the Valley by simply digging a hole in the valley floor.  These 
structures are referred to locally as ‘draglines’ and are commonly accessed by 
irrigators when bans on surface water irrigation are put in place.  Historically, 
some draglines have been treated as equivalent to surface water extractions 
and others not, depending in part on the proximity of the dragline to the 
stream and the arbitrary distance applied to define the water as being 
congruent at the time.  The upshot is that even where water metering records 
do exist, they may not fully capture the ‘environmental worth’ of modifying or 
halting a particular extractive activity.  In addition, and unlike the streamflow 
tender conducted by Melbourne Water, there would appear to be even less 
scope for using subsidies for groundwater extraction to offset surface water 
extraction and thereby meet the objectives of the streamflow plan
9.  In this 
context DSE (2003, p. 42) noted that “the exact nature of the relationship 
between groundwater use and streamflows […] may vary depending on the 
particular circumstances of the extraction site”.  The costs of an agency 
gaining sufficient knowledge of this relationship in order to assess the merits 
of alternative buyback offers appear prohibitive.   
 
Clearly, these circumstances produce major technical challenges to the use of 
buyback in its current form as a vehicle for achieving structural adjustment in 
the Upper Ovens.  Nevertheless, these should not be insurmountable or taken 
to imply that buyback has no role in this context.  Rather, we argue that 
                                                 
9 As noted earlier, the logic of this approach is itself dubious.   19
sharpening the focus of buyback schemes in a manner that takes account of 
information deficiencies holds considerable promise. 
 
Most of the challenges described in this section derive from information 
asymmetries between the agency conducting the buyback program and 
potential participants.  For example, farmers are generally well aware of the 
interrelationship between groundwater and surface water on their properties, 
even if the state agency is not.  Similarly, farmers are more inclined to know 
the extent to which they hold ‘sleeper’ or ‘dozer’ licences than is the state, at 
least until sufficiently robust metering data is developed.  In this contexts the 
potential seller has the ability to exploit the limited knowledge of the 
purchaser, as may have occurred in other instances of buyback highlighted in 
this paper.   
 
The problems of the Upper Ovens buyback can be addressed by focussing 
the tender at a scale that recognises the deficiencies in information and takes 
advantage of existing institutions capable of coordinating local action to meet 
the prescribed environmental outcome.  In the case of the Ovens Valley, 
many of the extractive users are affiliated with The Tobacco & Associated 
Farmers Co-operative Limited (TAFCO), a legacy of the former prominence of 
the industry in the region.  Information asymmetries between members of 
TAFCO are likely to be less severe than those that exist between the state 
and individual farmers.  Accordingly, a coordinated bilateral agreement struck 
between the state and TAFCO may yield superior results to tenders based on 
individual farmer participation.  A critical element of such an agreement would 
be the necessity to tie financial incentives directly to the achievement of 
streamflow targets.  This could include financial sanctions for non-compliance, 
as would be expected with most agreements in the private domain.  In order 
to maintain the core elements associated with buyback, the program would 
need to be structured upon standard benefit cost analyses in order to avoid 
capture by political interests.  
 
The intuitive appeal of this approach is also supported by a more rigorous 
analysis by Pincus and Shapiro (2008).  Pincus and Shapiro (2008) argue that 
welfare gains can be achieved by reaching a collective agreement with 
farmers on the sale of their water rights relative to voluntary sales by 
individual irrigators.  Notwithstanding that the model they propose embodies 
significant practical constraints
10 conceptualising buyback at an appropriate 
scale seems to be one of the simplest steps to improving its effectiveness. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Attitudes to water buyback have undergone a progressive transformation over 
the last decade and a half.  The initial resistance to buyback derived primarily 
from the perceived political costs of this approach, notwithstanding the 
commitments given to reallocating water in favour of the environment as early 
as 1994.  Buyback is now a key component of water policy, at least at the 
rhetorical level. 
                                                 
10 The approach partially relies on the threat of compulsory acquisition to help gain unanimous 
agreement amongst farmers re the total quantum of water to sell.   20
 
We have observed that the acceptance of buyback as a policy instrument has 
not come easily and the perceived political costs would appear to continue to 
have some influence over the sincerity with which it is being pursued.  There 
are several prominent instances outlined in this paper which highlight the 
need for greater scrutiny since there is a strong incentive to publicly overstate 
the magnitude of buyback, in order to appease environmental interests whilst 
securing water products from agriculture that amount to a limited reallocation, 
at best.  The costs of this approach may well prove severe even in the 
medium term, with limited progress on the environmental front and more 
intractable adjustment problems being created for a sector that continues to 
rely on largesse from the public purse, albeit in a different guise.   
 
Buyback in the Murray-Darling Basin is also arguably fragmented and 
attention to planning would appear deficient.  This has not only allowed for 
more political intervention than is desirable, it has also limited the potential 
gains from the mechanism.  Increased transparency and planning to define 
and measure suitable water products and endeavours focussed on the 
management of those products to deliver measurable environmental benefits 
are required.   
 
The case of the Upper Ovens Valley shows that instigating a buyback 
program capable of making genuine progress towards reallocation requires 
careful consideration of the scale and information components of the program.  
In that context we contend that additional work is urgently required to design 
buyback programs capable of dealing with these issues.   
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